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The Facts
Courtney Malcolm was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1985. Over a period of five years, he was
admitted to hospital on ten occasions, two of which were compulsory detentions under the Mental Health
Act 1983. However, his condition was stabilised by medication. Throughout the period, Mr Malcolm held
down employment, including a position in a housing office.2
In February 2002, Mr Malcolm rented a flat from Lewisham London Borough Council under a secure
tenancy for the purpose of section 79 Housing Act 1985. He was entitled to exercise the right to buy,
which he applied to do in March 2002. The purchase had still not been completed in 2004 when the
material events took place.
In 2004, Mr Malcolm had compliance problems with his oral medication, and it was reported that “he
became dysfunctional at work, eventually, simply sitting at his desk. He was losing weight, not sleeping
or eating.”3 Mr Malcolm was placed on depot medication in July 2004.
During the period of his medication problems, Mr Malcolm secured a mortgage offer and was due to
complete the purchase on 26 July 2004. However, on 22 June 2004, Mr Malcolm sub-let the flat on an
assured short-hold tenancy which was in breach of his tenancy agreement. Furthermore, by vacating the
property, Mr Malcolm lost his secure tenancy by virtue of sections 79(1) and 81 of the Housing Act 1985.
Once a secure tenancy ceases, it cannot subsequently once more become a secure tenancy.4
The Local Authority, Lewisham LBC, exercising its function of managing its housing stock, served a
notice to quit upon Mr Malcolm and commenced possession proceedings.
In his defence, Mr Malcolm argued that he was disabled within the meaning of the Disability
Discrimination Act 1995 (‘DDA’), the reason why the Council were seeking possession was related to his
disability, and unless the Council could show justification, the Court was precluded from making a
possession order against him. 
At first instance, the judge granted a possession order. Her principal reason for doing so was that the DDA
was not engaged where all security was lost and there was no discretion for the court to exercise. However,
she also made findings of fact in case she was wrong. Firstly, she concluded that Mr Malcolm was not
disabled within the meaning of the DDA as she was unable to say that his illness had a substantial effect
upon his ability to carry out day-to-day activities. Secondly, the decision to sub-let was a planned
decision, closely linked to his proposed purchase, not an irrational act caused by his illness.
1 Solicitor/Tutor, Law School, Northumbria University. The
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2 an indication that Mr Malcolm most probably understood
the consequences of sub-letting his tenancy.
3 Per Baroness Hale, Judgement, para 49
4 Section 93(2) Housing Act 1985
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The Court of Appeal5 allowed the appeal, dismissed the possession proceedings and declared that the
notice to quit and possession action constituted unlawful discrimination contrary to Part III of the DDA.
They found Mr Malcolm was a disabled person within the meaning of the Act, there was an “appropriate
relationship” between the Council’s actions and his illness, that his treatment had been less favourable
than that of other people to whom that reason did not apply, and (by majority) the fact that the landlord
did not know of the disability did not preclude a finding of discrimination.
The Law
As a consequence of sections 79(1), 81 and 93 Housing Act 1985, Mr Malcolm’s tenancy ceased to be
secure within the meaning of that Act. Therefore, he was no longer protected by section 84 Housing Act
1985 which prohibits the making of order for possession of a dwelling let under a secure tenancy unless
one of the grounds in Schedule 2 of the Act applies. Consequently, putting to one side the DDA,
Lewisham LBC had an unanswerable claim for possession of the dwelling.
Mr Malcolm sought to defend the claim on the grounds that the actions of Lewisham LBC amounted to
discrimination within the meaning of section 22(3) DDA6 which states:




(c) by evicting the disabled person, or subjecting him to any other detriment.” 
Discrimination is defined in section 24 DDA as:
“(1) ...a person (“A”) discriminates against a disabled person if–
(a) for a reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats
or would treat others to whom that reason does not or would not apply; and
(b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.” 
The same wording is used in section 5(1)7 of the Act to define discrimination in the employment context,
whilst section 20(1) uses this wording in the context of supply of goods and services.
Prior to Malcolm, the leading authority on the interpretation of disability related discrimination was the
Court of Appeal decision in Clark v Novacold8 which sought to interpret section 5(1) of the Act. The
courts are required to identify a comparator to whom the treatment can be compared. In identifying the
comparator, Mummery LJ set out two options in his judgment. A broad approach in identifying the
comparators focused on the first three words of the provision, “for a reason”. The expression, “which
relates to the disability” are words added not to identify or amplify the reason, but to specify a link
between the reason for the treatment and the disability which enables the disabled person to complain of
their treatment.9 The second option was for a narrow approach which uses the entire phrase “for a reason
which relates to a disabled person’s disability”.
5 [2007] EWCA Civ 763
6 Lewisham LBC v Malcolm originated prior to the
amendments made by the Disability Discrimination Act
1995 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1673 and
the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. Therefore, all
references to the legislation will be to its original format
unless otherwise indicated. 
7 Now section 3A(1)
8 [1999] I.C.R 951
9 Ibid, per Mummery LJ at p. 962 
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Following the broad approach, if a disabled employee is absent on long term sick leave because of his
disability, the comparator would be an employee who is not on long term sick leave. The comparator using
the narrow approach would be an employee who is on long term sick leave but does not have disability.
Mummery LJ stated in Novacold10 that the correct approach for identifying the comparator was the broad
approach.
Interestingly, Mummery LJ handed down what appears to be a conflicting judgment in S v Floyd and
EHRC11. This case involved a landlord who sought possession on the grounds of rent arrears. It was
alleged that the cause of the rent arrears was the tenant’s lack of mental capacity. The lack of mental
capacity was a disability and the “reason” for the possession claim was a reason related to the disability. It
was therefore argued that the possession claim was an unlawful act. In rejecting this argument, Mummery
LJ states at paragraph 48:
“It is not immediately obvious (a) how the 1995 Act could provide a basis for resisting a claim for
possession on a statutory mandatory ground or (b) how a landlord would be unlawfully discriminating
against a disabled tenant by taking steps to enforce his statutory right to a possession order for admitted
non-payment of rent for 132 weeks. The 1995 Act was enacted to provide remedies for disabled people
at the receiving end of unlawful discrimination. It was not aimed at protecting them from lawful litigation
or at supplying them with a defence to a breach of a civil law obligation. Like other anti-discrimination
legislation, the 1995 Act created statutory causes of action for unlawful discrimination in many areas,
such as employment, the provision of goods, facilities and services and the disposal and management of
premises, but it did not create any special disability related defence to lawful claims of others, such as a
landlord’s claim for possession of premises for arrears of rent. The legislation is not about disability per se:
it is about unlawful acts of discrimination on a prohibited ground, i.e., unjustified less favourable
treatment for a reason which relates to the disabled person’s disability.”12
Whilst prior to Malcolm, Novacold remained the leading authority, here there was conflicting Court of
Appeal authority, which on the facts aligned itself more favourably with the facts which existed in
Malcolm. 
If it is established that the actions are regarded as potentially discriminatory under section 24(1)(a),
potentially they can be justified under section 24(1)(b) DDA. However, there is an exhaustive list of
justifications in section 24(3) DDA including, inter alia, treatment necessary not to endanger the health
or safety of any person, and that the disabled person is incapable of entering into an enforceable
agreement. It was common ground that none of these would apply in Malcolm.13
However, section 5(3)14 DDA meant that, in the employment context, the actions are justified if they are
both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial. In other words, it is open for an
employer to raise any justification which satisfies this criterion.
The Decision
The House of Lords unanimously upheld the appeal, although they were far from unanimous in their
reasoning for doing so.
10 Ibid, p.964
11 [2008]EWCA Civ 201
12 A point noted by Lord Scott in Malcolm at para 37 of the
Judgment
13 Per Baroness Hale, Judgment, para 60
14 Now section 3A(3)
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The Lords upheld15 a long established meaning of ‘disability’ as a physical or mental impairment that has
a substantial adverse effect on an individual’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.
‘Substantial’ means “more than minor or trivial”.16
There was unanimity in that knowledge of the disability is required for there to be a claim under the DDA
although the Lords differed as to the extent of that knowledge. Lord Bingham, with Baroness Hale in
agreement17, stated that “knowledge, or at least imputed knowledge, is necessary.”18 Lord Scott however,
in agreement with an earlier Court of Appeal judgment19, considered that the disability must play a
motivating part in the mind, whether consciously or subconsciously, to establish discrimination.20
There was unanimous agreement that Lewisham LBC’s actions did not relate to Mr Malcolm’s disability.
Lord Bingham stated that “relates to” denotes “some connection, not necessarily close, between the
reason and the disability”21, whilst Baroness Hale stated that “[t]he connection between the disability
and the reason must not be too remote”22
By a majority of 4:1 (Baroness Hale dissenting) the Lords found that the correct comparator in disability
related discrimination is a person who to whom the underlying reason still applies. In other words, the
Lords preferred the narrow approach. However, there was disagreement as to the extent to which this
comparison should apply. Lords Scott23 and Brown24 found that Novacold was wrongly decided. Lord
Bingham, whilst not explicitly overruling Novacold, found it hard to accept that it was “rightly decided”.
25 Lord Neuberger limited himself to the premises provisions of the DDA.26
There was unanimous agreement that the DDA provided a defence, where there would otherwise be
none, the Lords’ reasoning being that the courts would not give legal effect to unlawful acts. However,
Lord Bingham stated that he “would not expect such a defence, in this field, to be made out very often.”27
Comment
This decision, whilst made in the context of housing, potentially has a huge effect on the application of
disability discrimination legislative provisions as it effectively neutralises any indirect disability
discrimination claim. The controversial part of the judgment relates to the comparator to be used in a
claim for disability related discrimination. Lord Neuberger stated:
“This appeal raises a number of points relating to the scope and the meaning of the provisions of Part III
of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”) insofar as they apply to “Premises”. In
particular, the competing arguments appear to require a choice to be made between two interpretations of
the definition of discrimination in section 24, one of which (supported by the appellant, the London
15 Dissenting, Baroness Hale upheld the finding at first
instance that Mr Malcolm was not a disabled person
within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act.
Whilst “it would seem very surprising if a person with
chronic schizophrenia, who needed regular anti-psychotic
medication if he was to live a normal life in society, did not
fall within the definition of disabled within the Act....the
judge did correctly direct herself on what the Act
required...I am not convinced that she applied the wrong
test, or that no judge who applied the right test could have
reached the conclusion she did.” (Judgment, para 67)
16 Goodwin v Patent Office [1999] ICR 302, EAT
17 Judgment, para 86
18 Ibid, para 18
19 Taylor v OCS Group Ltd [2006] ICR 1602
20 Judgment, para 39
21 Ibid, para 10
22 Ibid, para 83
23 Ibid, para 34
24 Ibid, para 112
25 Ibid, para 15
26 Ibid, para 139
27 Ibid, para 19
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Borough of Lewisham) would give the anti-discrimination provisions of section 22 an unattractively
restrictive effect, and the other of which (supported by the respondent, Mr Courtney Malcolm) would
give those provisions an extraordinarily far-reaching scope.”28. 
It is apparent that the Lords were caught in a difficult position as judgment either way would have had a
major impact on anti-discrimination law. The Lords were required to balance the interests of private law
rights against the interests of disabled people not to be treated less favourably.
What appears to underpin the majority judgments is the fact that the Novacold interpretation would
effectively have meant entrenchment of the disabled person’s tenancy. Disabled persons could not be
evicted if the reason had some causal connection to the disability. 
The apparent problem highlighted by Malcolm is the limited grounds of justification contained in section
24(3) DDA.29 This could be the reason why Novacold remained unchallenged for 9 years and has not
caused difficulty in practice. Disability related discrimination in the employment field can be justified if
“the reason for the failure is both material to the circumstances of the particular case and substantial.”30
As such, there are many circumstances where an employer can justify otherwise discriminatory actions.
Each case must be judged on its facts with regard to the Code of Practice.31 In practice, the justification
point is a low threshold and “there is considerable leeway afforded to employers when the issue of
justification is under scrutiny.”32 Evidence can also be found in a housing context. In Manchester City
Council v Romano33 the Court Of Appeal found that the tenants had not been unlawfully discriminated
against because the landlord’s actions were objectively justified by the need not to put the health of a
neighbour at risk.34
The problem in the housing context is that there is an exhaustive list of justifications contained within
section 24(3) which, inter alia, includes treatment necessary not to endanger the health and safety of any
person, or that the disabled person is incapable of entering into an enforceable agreement. As sub-letting
and rent arrears could not fit into this list, a tenant would always succeed.
The decision in Malcolm was unavoidable given the legislative framework. Whilst Baroness Hale set out
a strong argument that Parliament intended the broad interpretation to be used,35 the Court was not
going to give a judgment which would allow people to effectively breach their tenancy agreement and
have a cast iron defence, thus infringing the lawful rights of others. The consequences could have
potentially seen some tenants living rent-free. Parliament’s implicit approval of Novacold can be
attributed to the fact it was made in an employment context, and therefore the problems had not
materialised. It is from this point of view whereby we can understand Lord Scott’s statement: 
“Parliament must surely have intended the comparison…where the directed comparison is in identical
terms, to be a meaningful comparison in order to distinguish between treatment that was discriminatory
and treatment that was not.”36
The decision in Malcolm could have been limited to the housing provisions of the DDA. Only two of the
28 Ibid, para 119
29 These views were expressed by Michael Connelly, ‘The
House of Lords narrows the meaning of disability related
discrimination’, Emp. L.B. [2008] 1
30 Section 3A(3) Disability Discrimination Act 1995 as
amended
31 Clark v Novacold [1999] IRLR 318
32 O’Hanlon v Commissioners for HM Revenue and
Customs [2006] IRLR 840 per Elias J para 43
33 [2005] 1 W.L.R 2775
34 Sections 24(2) and 24(3)(a) DDA
35 Judgement, paras 77–80
36 Ibid, para 32
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five Lords expressly overruled Novacold, and therefore it was arguable that it still applied in the
employment context. Lord Neuberger left the door open to such argument at paragraph 158:
“It would, on the face of it at least, be very surprising if section 24(1)(a) had a different meaning from
the effectively identical worded section 5(1)(a), but it would not be an impossible conclusion. While the
1995 Act has a single definition of “disability” which is generally applicable, it has three effectively
identical definitions of “discrimination”, each of which applies in different fields (employment, goods
facilities and services, and premises). The combination of the contrast between section 5(3) and section
24(3), and the fact that the wider construction of section 5(1)(a) has been assumed to be right for some
years – perhaps together with other factors, such as subsequent parliamentary approval – could
conceivably justify the decision in Novacold being correct as to the effect of section 5(1)(a), despite the
conclusion I have reached as to the meaning of section 24(1)(a).”. 
Spencer Keen suggests37 that support for this proposition could be found in the UK’s compliance with
Council Directive of 27 November 2000 establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation 200/78/EC. The Framework Directive requires member states to protect
disabled employees from both direct and indirect discrimination. He argues that since the UK courts are
required to give a purposive interpretation to the DDA 1995 so it complies with the Framework
Directive, a claimant could argue that the Novacold interpretation of the DDA 1995 is the only
interpretation consistent with providing protection against indirect discrimination in accordance with the
Directive.
However, such argument now appears dead following the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal
(hereafter ‘EAT’) in The Child Support Agency (Dudley) v Truman38. In their judgment, the EAT stated
that the wording of sections 24(1)(a) and 3A(1)(a) are identical and therefore it would “seem surprising
if the comparator in one provision was different from that in the other.”39 Further, the EAT concluded
that justification could not impact on the question of who is the appropriate comparator for the purposes
of unlawful justification. 
It is noted that the Framework Directive was not raised in Truman and potentially there is still scope for
argument. However, it appears that under the current legislation, the narrow approach will be adopted in
all fields unless a there is a further ruling from the House of Lords.
Lawyers need to be creative in the use of the reasonable adjustment provisions of the DDA.40 Many
claims of disability related discrimination in the employment context could also be brought as a
‘reasonable adjustment’ claim as employers will be required to take appropriate action in respect of
employees with disabilities. In the context of goods, facilities and services, claims generally relate to a
failure on the provider to make reasonable adjustments in any event. The comments in Malcolm relating
to knowledge should not have an impact as Sedley J confirmed in Roads v Central Trains Ltd41 that the
duty to make adjustments in a services context is anticipatory and therefore knowledge of the disability
is not required.
In relation to the premises context, it has been suggested42 that the draft European Council Directive on
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability
37 Spencer Keen, ‘Discrimination: Blame it on the dog’, 158
NLJ 1216
38 UKEAT/0293/08/CEA
39 Ibid, per His Honour Judge Peter Clark, para. 22 
40 Sections 4A and 21
41 [2004] EWCA Civ 1541
42 Robert Latham and Catherine Casserley, ‘Disability-
related discrimination claims after Lewisham LBC v
Malcolm’, Legal Action, September 2008 
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age, sexual orientation contains obligations in relation to both indirect discrimination and the duty to
make reasonable adjustments. Therefore, it is argued that, if finalised in its present form, it is likely to
require changes to the current provisions in the UK, particularly in relation to premises. 
In the longer term, it is likely that Parliament will remedy the narrow interpretation. The proposed single
Equality Bill43 may counter the effect of Malcolm. As suggested above, it is arguable that the true problem
with disability related discrimination is the restricted justification defences available in the housing
context, whilst employment context offers employers’ unrestricted justification defences. The
Government has stated that it wants to “replace these different justification defences with a single
‘objective justification’ test which would require that the conduct in question is a proportionate means of
achieving a legitimate aim.”44 However, if the wording of disability related discrimination remains
unchanged, the courts will need to re-interpret the legislation, although hopefully they will be able to do
so without the all or nothing approach the current legislation seems to demand.
43 Referred to in the Queen’s Speech on 3 December 2008.
44 The Equality Bill – Government Response to Consultation, Government Equalities Office, July 2008, Chapter 11.12
